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Abstract
This thematic issue, “Varieties of Technocratic Populism around theWorld,” investigates ideological origins of technocratic
populism and situates it among other types of populism. It is composed of 11 articles that bring together 18 scholars from
around the world with a wide variety of perspectives. Technocratic populism is an output-oriented populism that directly
links voters to leaders via expertise. It emerges as a response to a crisis of governance, reproaches mainstream parties for
it and offers solutions that challenge traditional left–right divisions in politics. New leaders combine populism with tech-
nocracy: They offer expertise, often harnessed in business, but also a direct, personalized link to ‘ordinary’ citizens. Above
all, they politicize expertise to gain legitimacy. Technocratic populism primarily responds to frustrations of the electorate
with poor governance, not to nativist grievances or to the plight of the most vulnerable citizens. In a new social contract, it
is expected that voters renounce politics and political parties and that they turn into spectators who observe how techno-
cratic elites adopt solutions that benefit the ‘ordinary people.’ Technocratic populism is a growing challenge to pluralistic
forms of representative democracy and calls for further scholarly attention.
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1. Introduction
This thematic issue, “Varieties of Technocratic Populism
around the World,” investigates ideological origins of
technocratic populism and situates it among other
types of populism. Technocratic populism is an output-
oriented populism that directly links voters to leaders via
expertise. It emerges as a response to a crisis of gover-
nance, reproaches mainstream parties for it and offers
solutions that challenge traditional left–right divisions in
politics. New leaders combine populism with technoc-
racy: They offer expertise, often harnessed in business,
but also a direct, personalized link to ‘ordinary’ citizens.
Above all, they politicize expertise to gain legitimacy.
Technocratic populism is rooted in two alterna-
tives to representative democracy—technocracy and
populism (Bickerton & Accetti, 2017, 2021; Caramani,
2017). Citizens face the duality of technocratic populism.
Populism is responsive and places the ‘people’ at the
epicenter of democracy (Kaltwasser, 2014). Technocracy
stands for responsible governance, expertise, compe-
tence, effectiveness, and ‘optimal outcomes.’ It is dis-
tinct from bureaucracy, which is a mode of gover-
nance, because technocracy is a logic of governance.
Technocratic approaches focus on problem-solving and
conflict neutralization (O’Donnell, 1994), and emphasize
a regulatory state that makes rules and monitors their
implementation (Majone, 1994).
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Populists and technocrats are anti-political actors
with an ‘unmediated,’ proceduralist view of democracy
(Rosanvallon, 2011; Taggart, 2002), which implies that
they embrace a non-pluralist concept of a society, the
existence of a unified general interest, and a direct,
unmediated, relationship between the people and their
leaders. Technocratic populism is an anti-elite ideology
that instrumentalizes governance and exploits compe-
tence. Technocratic populists cultivate the appearance
of authenticity and proximity to the ordinary people but
also demobilize the electorate by instilling civic apathy
(Buštíková & Guasti, 2019). In many instances, techno-
cratic populists claim to ‘run the state as a firm,’ which
gives them cover to delegitimize political opponents
because they lack ‘expertise’ and relish in the cycles of
parliamentary deliberations.
Technocratic populism primarily responds to frustra-
tions of the electorate with poor governance, not to
nativist grievances or to the plight of the most vulnera-
ble citizens. In a new social contract, it is expected that
voters renounce politics and political parties and that
they turn into spectators who observe how technocratic
elites adopt solutions that benefit the ‘ordinary people’
(cf. Urbinati, 2014). In sum, technocratic populism is a
growing challenge to pluralistic forms of representative
democracy. As such, it calls for a scholarly attention both
from historical and comparative perspectives.
The thematic issue is composed of 11 articles that
bring together 18 scholars from around the world with
a wide variety of perspectives. Five case studies inves-
tigate the evolution, public support and consequences
of technocratic populism for democracy in the Czech
Republic (Guasti, 2020a), France (Perottino & Guasti,
2020), Georgia (Aprasidze & Siroky, 2020), Italy (Castaldo
& Verzichelli, 2020) and Spain (Ganuza & Font, 2020).
Three are also two-country comparisons. Piquer and
Jäger (2020) see the cartelization of party systems as
a driving factor for the rise of intra- and extra-party
techno-populist logic, focusing on the UK and Spain.
Snegovaya (2020) compares voter attitudes in France
and the Czech Republic. Buštíková and Baboš (2020)
explore governance during the Covid-19 pandemic in
Czechia and Slovakia. Finally, three articles offer a
broad cross-national perspective. Reiser and Hebenstreit
(2020) explore the relationship between Euroscepticism
and technocratic populism. Semenova (2020) examines
the historical legacies of ministerial appointments in
Eastern Europe. Barrenechea and Dargent (2020) offer a
study of populist governance in Latin America.
2. Five Lessons for the Future of Technocratic Populism
This rich body of original research leads us to derive
five lessons for future studies of technocratic populism.
First, technocratic populism is a distinct sub-type of
populism. Second, it tends to emerge when party sys-
tems weaken. Third, technocratic populists offer a direct,
unmediated link to voters via expertise. Fourth, when
in power, they combine populist responsiveness with
expert-driven responsibility. Finally, the pandemic facili-
tates democratic decay and enhances the appeal of tech-
nocratic populism. We outline these lessons in more
detail now before we summarize individual papers.
2.1. Technocratic Populism is a Distinct Type of Populism
Technocratic populism is a unique type of populism.
It responds to a salient contemporaneous grievance of
voters in many democracies related to sub-par gover-
nance by mainstream political elites. It is neither a resid-
ual category, nor a hybrid type defined by centrism.
Populism co-exists with diverse host ideologies and log-
ics, beyond nativism or socialism (cf. Art, 2020; Caiani
& Graziano, 2019; Zulianello, 2020). Furthermore, it can-
not be automatically linked to illiberalism (Norris &
Inglehart, 2019).
2.2. Technocratic Populism Emerges When Party
Systems Weaken
Two conditions are conducive for the emergence of tech-
nocratic populism—the implosion of the existing party
system (Castaldo & Verzichelli, 2020; Perottino & Guasti,
2020) and the exhaustion of the left–right ideological
cleavage (Buštíková & Guasti, 2019). Technocratic pop-
ulism combines the redemptive promise of populism
with the technocratic promise of competent governance
(Aprasidze & Siroky, 2020; Perottino & Guasti, 2020) and
can restructure intra-party logic (Piquer & Jäger, 2020).
It rejects existing parties and political ideologies as obso-
lete and it attacks established and other populist parties
as incompetent. Populist technocratic appeal enables
new anti-establishment leaders to instrumentalize com-
petence, civility and impartiality of knowledge to distin-
guish themselves from the populist radical right as well
as the left (cf. Buštíková, 2020).
2.3. Technocratic Populism Opposes Mediated Politics
Technocratic populism is a strategy to directly appeal
to voters and it uses the public’s trust in knowledge
and expertise as a legitimacy shield (Rosanvallon, 2011).
Unmediated politics replace accountability (Guasti,
2020a), through direct channels of communication
(Buštíková & Guasti, 2019), democratic innovations
(Perottino & Guasti, 2020) and alternative crisis manage-
ment bodies (Buštíková & Baboš, 2020). Populist leaders
concentrate power when they circumvent established
institutions and remove expertise from public scrutiny.
2.4. Technocratic Populism Combines Responsiveness
(Populism) with Responsibility (Technocracy)
In a crisis, the tension between responsiveness and
responsibility increases.When technocratic populists are
unable to control negative policy trends, they favor
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responsiveness at the expense of responsibility. Selected
experts serve at the pleasure of the populist leader.
Therefore, unpopular experts are replaced, and popu-
lar experts serve to increase the leader’s appeal and
legitimacy. This leads to the prioritization of policies
that deliver instantaneous popularity boosts rather than
complex, responsible policies with long-term horizons
(Buštíková & Baboš, 2020; Guasti, 2020a; Perottino &
Guasti, 2020).
2.5. The Pandemic Facilitates Democratic Decay
To solve the unprecedented Covid-19 health crisis, lead-
ers have to engage with epidemiologists and public
health officials. Because they emphasize expertise, tech-
nocratic populists might initially benefit from the surge
in demand for non-political medical knowledge during
the pandemic (Guasti, 2020b). Technocratic populists
conceal accountability by hiding behind experts and
by shifting decisions on pandemic responses outside
of the parliamentary arena. This instrumentalization of
technocratic expertise then justifies executive aggran-
dizement (Bermeo, 2016) which contributes to demo-
cratic decay.
3. Overview of Contributions
Now we turn to a brief description of the articles in the
order that they appear in the thematic issue.
Guasti (2020a) focuses on the effects of technocratic
populism in power on democracy. She highlights the
illiberal tendencies of technocratic populism in power,
best expressed in executive aggrandizement. Without
the restraint of institutional veto points and civil soci-
ety, technocratic populism undermines electoral compe-
tition (vertical accountability), judiciary independence,
legislative oversight (horizontal accountability), and free-
dom of the press (diagonal accountability).
Castaldo and Verzichelli (2020) highlight the inter-
play between technocracy and populism in Italy. They
show the variability of anti-establishment and techno-
cratic appeals: a business outsider taking on the sys-
tem (Berlusconi); a popular technocrat unsuccessfully
trying to turn popularity into electoral success avoiding
populism (Monti, Conte); an insider trying to mix pop-
ulist party leadership with a technocratic executive style
(Renzi); and, finally, a populist replacing technocratic
appeal with nativism (Salvini). Thus, while latent in Italy,
the interplay between technocracy and populism comes
in many forms, and adapts and persists over time.
Buštíková and Baboš (2020) explore how populists
govern in crisis. They focus on the actions of technocratic
populists in power during the first wave of the Covid-19
crisis in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. They iden-
tify three features of the populist pandemic response:
bypassing established, institutionalized channels of cri-
sis response, responsive policy making and politicization
of expertise.
Barrenechea and Dargent (2020) scrutinize conflict
cohabitation and cooperation between populists and
technocrats in Latin America. They find that cohabita-
tion is more common than conflict and that conflict is
moderated by two conditions: the programmatic man-
date of populists and the economic context of their rise
to power.
Ganuza and Font (2020) analyze public opin-
ion towards technocracy using a unique survey and
focus group data from Spain, where a political party,
Ciudadanos (Citizens) deploys technocratic populism.
They find that, while most citizens are dismayed with
the inefficiency of established political parties and in
favor of a generic idea of politics with experts, people
lean towards a consultative role of experts in politics
and support representative democracy.
Piquer and Jäger (2020) investigate two left-wing
subtypes of technocratic populism at the party level:
Corbynism in the United Kingdom and Podemos in Spain.
They find that technocratic traits result from the carteliza-
tion of party systems, but also from electoral con-
texts and policy environments increasingly dominated by
expert claims and expert institutions. The Covid-19 crisis
has reinforced the technocratic aspects of Podemos as a
governing party.
Perottino and Guasti (2020) analyze the electoral
success of Emmanuel Macron, who combined personal
charisma and technocratic expertise to win the presi-
dency in 2017. Technocratic populism enabled Macron
to transcend the political left and right while simultane-
ously fending off radical populist competitors. Macron
refused traditional labels (centrism), elite recruitment
patterns, and mediated politics. Instead, he created
new forms of responsiveness by ‘giving voice to the
people’ while at the same time relying on techno-
cratic competence.
Snegovaya (2020) compares support for the right-
wing parties and technocratic populists in France and the
Czech Republic. She finds that voters for right-wing pop-
ulists share many common features, but voters for tech-
nocratic populists have few commonalities aside from
higher levels of trust in political institutions.
Reiser and Hebenstreit (2020) investigate the inter-
play between populism and Euroscepticism at the party
level. They show that left- and right-wing populist parties
articulate different anti-technocratic positions, in line
with their respective host ideology. The technocratic cri-
tique of the EU is more complex for technocratic pop-
ulists, who rely on technocratic appeals domestically.
Some (ANO 2011 and GERB) do not have a critical stance
towards EU technocracy, while others (M5S and OL’aNO)
have utilized technocratic critiques of the EU as a part of
their (soft) Eurosceptic posture.
Aprasidze and Siroky (2020) argue that in a hybrid
regime, technocratic populism is utilized as a façade
to cover authoritarian and oligarchic tendencies and
inhibit democratization efforts. Bidzina Ivanishvili came
to power in 2012 and, despite not holding any official
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position in the government, has since ruled Georgia
by proxies using corporatist and patrimonial forms
of governance.
Semenova (2020) examines the appointments and
survival of expert ministers in eleven Central and Eastern
European countries over two decades (1990–2012). Her
analysis shows that communist legacies contribute to
a congruence between technocratic appointments and
public expectations for expertise in government.
4. Conclusions
Technocratic populism is a distinct type of populism.
It emerges when party systems are weakened and
issues of governance gain salience. It opposes medi-
ated politics and combines responsiveness (populism)
and responsibility (technocracy). The Covid-19 crisis is
uniquely conducive to the appeal of technocratic pop-
ulism: The demand for public health expertise is at an
all-time high, and good governance is amatter of life and
death. This thematic issue shows that the dual approach
of technocratic populism to governance makes it com-
petitive against the established parties as well as the
right- or left-wing populist parties. When in power, tech-
nocratic populism exploits ambiguity: It is flexible in its
appeal, but also volatile and diffuse when it comes to the
sources of its public support (Buštíková & Baboš, 2020;
Perottino & Guasti, 2020; Snegovaya, 2020). Future
research should study technocratic populism alongside
more traditional types of populism and might focus on
the sources of its appeal, executive competence, and its
effect on liberal democracy.
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